The Cossacks and Primitive Democracy
One of the Cossacks' national myths is that their ancestors were pioneers in democracy. The krug (in Russia, especially on the Don) or rada (in Ukraine and the Kuban') had few, if any, analogues elsewhere in the feudal Europe and Asia of the 15th Century on. These gatherings would be convened as needed to discuss important policy decisions, and also met on a regular basis to elect Cossack officials. Despite the different names, the principle was broadly similar: every Cossack male* had the right to attend and be heard, and each man's vote weighed the same. Like mating for spiders, elections could be fraught with danger as well as potential success: an ataman (chief) who had grievously offended the Cossacks, whether by poor decisons, or by egregious corruption, could not only be voted out, he was occasionally lynched.
Note the qualifier "egregious": it was accepted that the elected man would use his office for personal gain, as well as distributing largesse among his supporters both before and after his election: large amounts of vodka were provided by each candidate, as well as other forms of hospitality, in the hope of attracting support during the rada. This initial outlay needed to be recouped in some way.
The rada itself seems to have been a noisy and rather chaotic gathering; although every man present in theory had the right to be heard, in practice a loud voice and/or a chorus of supporters prevailed. There was none of your effete secret balloting, despite the one-man-one-vote principle, elections and decisions were in practice carried by acclaim, which again points up the value of developing a band of supporters to shout louder than the opposition. Inevitably, this framework militated against a subtle elaboration of arguments and in favour of broad brush-strokes - what we would doubtless call soundbites today. (To be fair, this analysis risks missing more sophisticated political manouevring in the run-up to the rada, as the candidates sought to build a power-base.) It also effectively entrenched corruption, as both candidates and their supporters sought enrichment and social advancement.
Nonetheless, in the context of feudal and autocratic European empires, and especially of serfdom in Russia, the existence and persistence of even the crude proto-democracy of the krug and rada was extraordinary. After the dissolution in the late 18th century of the Zaporozhian Cossacks removed one of the two great free Cossack hosts, Peter the Great was able to impose the direct appointment of atamans on the other, the Don Cossacks. The krug was thus effectively rendered impotent, although pale imitations continued to be held.
The Cossacks, particularly the rank-and-file, felt the loss of one of their most important distinguishing institutions keenly and, indeed, this proto-democratic myth retains great power for the Cossack revival: although the main organisation of the Kuban Cossack national movement now names itself the Kuban Cossack Host, it initially (self-)consciously styled itself the Rada, and is still popularly referred to by that name. Ironically enough, given the relatively late creation of the Kuban Cossack Host - and it was created, by Imperial fiat, in contrast to the organic development of the Don and Zaporozhian hosts - its high-ranking pre-Revolutionary officials were all appointed from the centre rather than elected locally. As ever, it is worth taking some time to examine myths, rather than swallowing them whole.
* My use of pronouns in this piece reflects the argument that Cossack national identity implies maleness, which does of course beg a certain practical question...
Note the qualifier "egregious": it was accepted that the elected man would use his office for personal gain, as well as distributing largesse among his supporters both before and after his election: large amounts of vodka were provided by each candidate, as well as other forms of hospitality, in the hope of attracting support during the rada. This initial outlay needed to be recouped in some way.
The rada itself seems to have been a noisy and rather chaotic gathering; although every man present in theory had the right to be heard, in practice a loud voice and/or a chorus of supporters prevailed. There was none of your effete secret balloting, despite the one-man-one-vote principle, elections and decisions were in practice carried by acclaim, which again points up the value of developing a band of supporters to shout louder than the opposition. Inevitably, this framework militated against a subtle elaboration of arguments and in favour of broad brush-strokes - what we would doubtless call soundbites today. (To be fair, this analysis risks missing more sophisticated political manouevring in the run-up to the rada, as the candidates sought to build a power-base.) It also effectively entrenched corruption, as both candidates and their supporters sought enrichment and social advancement.
Nonetheless, in the context of feudal and autocratic European empires, and especially of serfdom in Russia, the existence and persistence of even the crude proto-democracy of the krug and rada was extraordinary. After the dissolution in the late 18th century of the Zaporozhian Cossacks removed one of the two great free Cossack hosts, Peter the Great was able to impose the direct appointment of atamans on the other, the Don Cossacks. The krug was thus effectively rendered impotent, although pale imitations continued to be held.
The Cossacks, particularly the rank-and-file, felt the loss of one of their most important distinguishing institutions keenly and, indeed, this proto-democratic myth retains great power for the Cossack revival: although the main organisation of the Kuban Cossack national movement now names itself the Kuban Cossack Host, it initially (self-)consciously styled itself the Rada, and is still popularly referred to by that name. Ironically enough, given the relatively late creation of the Kuban Cossack Host - and it was created, by Imperial fiat, in contrast to the organic development of the Don and Zaporozhian hosts - its high-ranking pre-Revolutionary officials were all appointed from the centre rather than elected locally. As ever, it is worth taking some time to examine myths, rather than swallowing them whole.
* My use of pronouns in this piece reflects the argument that Cossack national identity implies maleness, which does of course beg a certain practical question...
Labels: Cossacks, myths, proto-democracy
posted by Ian Appleby at 12:45 am
15 Comments:
Cossack identity is something of an oddity. Until the middle of the nineeenth century the eastern Ukrainians were Cossacks, the western ones were considered Ruthernians. A shared identity only emerged as a sub culture of Pan-Slavism.
The distinction between the two Little Russian groups datea to the times of the Mongol conquests. Ruthenia means Little Russia, as Ukraine does in Russian.
The Ruthenes were tose whose history from the Collapse of Kie in the 1250s was domiated by Poland till the 1790s and Adopted a Western, Catholic way of life. The Cossacks were those who remained under Tatar rule till Ivan the terrible and adopted an asian, steppe way of life.
I would se Germanic/Scandinacian people's with the Moots, Things and Sokes were amongst the true pioneeers of true democracy.
...it was accepted that the elected man would use his office for personal gain, as well as distributing largesse among his supporters both before and after his election...
Sounds pretty reasonable to me, Ian.
CBI, thanks for such an interesting contribution. I agree wholeheartedly with your first sentence. I'm not an expert on Ukrainian history, I come at the question from a Russian perspective, and I'm no expert there, either. But my understanding was more that, rather than Eastern Ukrainians being Cossacks, it is truer to say there were Cossacks in Eastern Ukraine (as well as elsewhere around the periphery of the Russian Empire). Of those in Ukraine, there were on the one hand those who fell under Polish control, at least until Bogdan Khmelnitsky's rebellion, and on the other the independent Zaporozhian Sich,further to the east and south.
Bogdan Khmelnitsky and Cossack independence became a unifying trope for Ukrainian nationalists,especially in the 19th century. This meme followed a peculiar trajectory, in that the Soviets attempted to snuff out this Cossack identification, whereas those areas of Ukraine that fell under German rule were less concerned. More modern Ukrainian history, both of the Civil War and WWII, was too divisive for the fledgeling independence movement, whereas the Cossack myth could help repair the (over-simplified) split between Western and Eastern Ukraine. Bizarrely, then, following the collapse of the USSR, the Ukrainian nationalist myth of Cossack descent came from regions that had never had a Cossack presence, culminating in a trans-Ukraine march from west to east to commemorate the 500th anniversary of the foundation of the Zaporozhian Sich.
Strangely, then, for Ukrainians, the Cossacks form an important part of their origin myth, whereas in Russia the various Cossack movements seem to be asserting their distinctiveness from "just" a Russian identity, although loyalty to one or another imagining of "Russia" remains a key aspect of their identity.
I think there are many Cossacks who would raise an eyebrow, if not a fist, at the notion that they were ever under Tatar rule... As ever,the reality is more complex than that kneejerk reaction would suggest. Cossack culture and practices clearly owed much to other steppe and Caucasian nations,and there was no little inter-marrying. The Zaporozhians, in particular, but also the Don Cossacks often formed tactical alliances with other steppe tribes: they were not always faithful servants of the Tsar... Equally, though, I don't think they could ever truly be thought of as falling under the Tatar yoke.
I know still less of those far-off lands Germany and Scandinavia. Could you go into a bit more detail? Having said that, I was actually trying with this post to explore the power of myths in nation-building, rather than attempt to establish whose democracy was first and truest. (There's a more mischievous resonance, as well...)
Oh, and to put my pedant's hat on (like I don't always wear it...) Malorossiya is literally Little Russia, but you're right to say the term was commonly used interchangeably - at least by Russians - with Ukraina, which literally means something like "Near the border".
James, truly they were precursors of contemporary democracies...
Germanic monrchy had very different origins to Romance feudal ones. It gre up wards from the people , if you like, rather than downwards. The Scandinavian and english monarchies emerged from tribal folk monarchies where kings debated with the elders of their peoples, a tradition encompassed by the moots of saxon peoples, including the Great Moot of England, or Witangemot. The Norse had their Things (hence the Norwegian Storting) and Sokes. Romance monarchies descended from Barbarin leaders being given Romn lands to govern as consuls of the empire. In theory they were in orgin only kings over their own subjects in such lands, but after the Western Empire fell they inherited the Imperium in their own lands.
Magna Carta only confirms the rights the English had had since time immemorial, asit states in it's opening.
Until 1789, the French never thought they had any.
Ah, thanks for expanding on that. Unless I've misunderstood, though, it's still based around hereditary monarchy on the one hand and elders on the other.
I think Cossacks might argue that, as a community made up of those who had fled serfdom and carved out a community of their own in the steppe, they were all equal, all had a say in decision making, and all were theoretically capable of being elected ataman, regardless of seniority.
In practice, of course, class distinctions and an elite quickly developed, and the elected Cossack offices tended to remain in the hands of just a few families - never let the facts get in the way of a good myth, though... And, as James was hinting, our modern-day democracies too seem marked as much by their breech as their observance.
What you say about Romance monarchies after the fall of the Western Empire immediately evokes for me the situation in the Former Soviet Union shortly after it gained the prefix: the Union republics formed de facto nation-states, ready to exploit the vacuum caused by the Soviet collapse. The one exception to this was the RSFSR/RF. I think the weakness of "Russian" identity is crucial to the contrasting paths of the Cossack legacy in Ukraine and in Russia.
Bit out of my league. Mind you heard a very interesting speech at my Toastmasters Club tonight (yes,thats 2 nights in succession)The in question was given by a young lady of Ukrainian in origin. She pointed out a little of the history and the ongoing political turmoil there.
Yes,USSR-CIS, Rome-Byzantium.
The trouble in the central asian republics is that they are pseudo-states anyway, created in the thirties by Stalin's ethno-linguist experts. But language alone doen't make a people, or ther'd be no SNP. Ukraine, like Yugoslavi and Czechoslavakia, is a concept based on the decision of nineteenth century liguists on what constituted separate slav languages as opposed to dialects. The facts of History, Religion and Culture often being ignored.
For a better understanding of the widely separate views of dark age Romance monarchies to Germanic ones, compare Gregory of Tours to Bede.
Indeed, although you could apply the same argument about at least 14 of the 15 Union republics. What I find very interesting is that, although language did seem to be the main criterion by which "nations" were distinguished in the USSR, the nativisation policies of the 1920s and 1930s included the creation of national intelligentsias as well as political cadres; far from ignoring history and culture, the former were specifically tasked with the invention of national traditions, creating new national cultures and writing national histories for the new nation.
In addition, the "facts"of history, religion and culture are so often open to very different interpretations: one of the problems facing Russian identity, for example, is whether she should look to her Muscovite -era uniqueness, or her Petrine-era adoption of Western ideas. Both are clearly valid historical periods that Russia can draw on, but the two are mutually incompatible.
Although these nations were invented, in Hobsbawm's sense, and although the republics were equally artificial, Soviet nation-building was generally successful enough to create genuine feelings of loyalty among the 14 titular nations, excluding the ethnic Russians. (I would tend to argue that any nation-building effort is similarly artificial, but can have concrete results.) There is a profound and lasting knock-on effect of this policy in post-Soviet territory.
I recently read an interesting article suggesting that ethnic Russian academics had been engaged in quasi-ethnolinguistic nationalism for "their" pet nationalities since the mid 19th century, and that the nativisation policy of the 1920s and 30s was actually a larger-scale continuation of this - it was the earlier work that provided the basis for the Soviet policy.
Great post. I don't agree with Crushed by Ingsoc about Germanic models of monarchy- one of our problems is a lack of evidence there and institutions like the English Witangemot were more informal assemblies of nobles than anything else- indeed one of the interesting things about the early Germanic kings is their absolute power, there wasn't much of a concept of law until the introduction of it by kings trying to immitate emperors. There is a fascinating piece by Patrick Wormald on that.
But in this context I do think some of early Roman stuff is very interesting- the way that the Romans used to line up on the Field of Mars in centuries in order to vote- the first centuries were all the cavalry (ie those rich enough to own a horse) then came the heavy infantry (ditto to buy armour) and then the light. Was the Cossack assembly similarly graduated by wealth. Its interesting that in Rome at some point in the third century or second century you get the emergance of the assembly fo tribes which organise citizens fairly randomly amongst tribes and proceed in the same way to a decision.
I seem to have got away from the Cossacks but this is one of your best!
This highbrow stuff is all well and good but I know that you really want to blog about 70's Rock Groups!
Delicolor, you've sussed the secret connection: Power metal and Cossack hairspray! Incidentally, this makes for entertaining reading, not always in the way that the contributors seemed to intend. And since when was biking a pleasure to feel guilty about?
Gracchi, many thanks for the high praise, not to mention the link, your article takes these themes in an interesting direction; I hope to have something more concrete to add soon. Pace Matt M, though, my insomnia is taking its toll tonight...
Very interesting post - thank you.
Shani
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