America and the Theories of International Relations

William Pfaff has written an interesting assessment of the power of the United States in the world and how American foreign policy makers should look at that world in the New York Review of Books. Pfaff diagnoses a missionary condition in American politics which seeks to save the rest of the world from itself and introduce it to democracy, freedom and the American way. Tracing that particular predetermination of foreign policy back to the era of American isolation and the Monroe Doctrine, Pfaff argues that the Cold War encouraged American diplomats to continue thinking that America was 'special', a power unlike others, a servant of democracy, a power whose motives could not be impugned but who could impugne all other motives. He then argues that such an attitude still lies behind the American aspiration since the First Gulf War to secure the world from itself, Pfaff argues that it has led policy makers in the states to severely misunderstand the phenomena of terrorism, to get nuclear proliferation wrong and to fail to appreciate how it might relate to other powers- Russia and China in particular. For Pfaff the United States alternates between Woodrow Wilson's idealism that the world can be remade in the image of New York and Robert Taft's isolationism, the belief that the United States should withdraw into the image of New York, up onto the City on the Hill.

Pfaff argues that neither approach is useful because both Taft and Wilson fail to understand that the United States is a state just like any other. Temporarily invested with huge power thanks to its geographical size and comparatively early industrialisation, not to mention the fact that continental America was untouched by the great conflicts raging across Eurasia in the 20th Century, it has mistaken fortune for virtue. Pfaff argues that there is no trend in history- adapting a thought of Karl Popper he convicts his foes with the sin of historicism. Rather than this vision, Pfaff argues that the United States should promote the security of a state system within the world. It should stay true to the Westphalian maxim that the best thing to do in foreign affairs is remain a defender of the rights of states to do what they wish within their own borders. He wants Americans to realise that not all foreign conflicts are about attitudes to the United States. That there is complexity in every situation- that to take an example the war in Vietnam was no cosmic conflict against communism but rather a Vietnamese nationalist revolt. Understanding these elements Pfaff argues will abate foreign fears that the United States is a state in favour of permanent revolution- and so needs to be deterred and hostilely campaigned against. It will allow a rejuvenation of American soft power and lead in his view to a much more stable relationship with the rising power of China.

Pfaff is right in his key insight. America's era is over. The economic powers of China and India will soon be accompanied with military power. Furthermore in a world where no nuclear power can seriously threaten another- the erosion of American soft power means that its ability to influence other states has also been significantly eroded. Events in Africa and the latest Chinese campaign to secure influence on that continent demonstrate the effects of American unpopularity as does German Russian raprochement. The problems with his thesis lie not so much in his analysis of the ills of American policy making, as in his finessing of the classic problem with Westphalian diplomatic theory- the issue of human rights and genocide. We are still no closer to understanding how intervention to save people from genocide works. Pfaff argues that intervention to save people from genocide is often counter productive (true), can be manipulated for other ends (true) and has been done successfully (Liberia). He is right- the cases where oppressive regimes have been successfully overthrown simply by foreign involvement- Sierra Leone and Liberia come to mind- have been in relatively small countries and with massive foreign support- what happens in a large country and without support is a different matter. If Pfaff's answer then is to not intervene, he should be more honest about it- there is a reason that the second world war is seen as the just war the West has embarked on and it has nothing to do with the territorial integrity of Poland. Before I abandon my view that going to war to save the Jews would be right- (except in conditions where war would mean total destruction- nuclear powers etc) I need to hear some better arguments.

All in all this is a good discussion in a short article of American foreign policy- questions are finessed, I'm not so sure of the history as is Mr Pfaff and feel that he has painted that picture with too broad a brush stroke. The idea though that the world is a complex place and that it is better to acknowledge complexity rather than fit complexity into our patterns of cosmic conflict, that we need to be aware that war is a blunt instrument and frightened states behave in worse ways than secure ones and that soft power is often a more potent means to turning the world around- all these ideas are worth talking about. If there are problems- problems with the history and with the way that genocide demands intervention- then they are problems which reveal the problematic state of our discussion about foreign policy at the moment.

N.B. An anonymous commentator rightly picks me up on implying that the second world war was fought to save the Jews- though I may have written that it was not meant to come out that way. What I meant to say is that the post facto justification of the second world war is much more about the Jews than about the casus belli which was the invasion of Poland. That most of us think of the second world war as uniquely just because of the holocaust means something about the way that we think about war and the fact that we lying about the reasons for the second world war is interesting. But that basic moral rhetoric about world war two also says something about our explicit moral thinking, including my own moral thinking. Pfaff probably wants us to be more honest than we are willing to be.